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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 15-3597 
_____________ 
 
PROFESSIONAL EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES ASSOCIATION OF NEW JERSEY 
IAFF 
LOCAL 4610 PFANJ AFLCIO, 
                                                         Appellant  
 
v. 
 
MONMOUTH OCEAN HOSPITAL SERVICES CORPORATION (MONOC) 
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civ. No. 3-13-cv-02135) 
District Judge: Hon. Michael A. Shipp 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 6, 2016 
______________ 
 
Before: JORDAN, VANASKIE, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: March 1, 2017) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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 Appellant Professional Emergency Medical Association of New Jersey, IAFF 
Local No. 4610, PFANJ, AFL-CIO, (“PEMSA”), appeals adverse rulings by the District 
Court concerning breach of contract claims asserted by PEMSA on behalf of three of its 
members against their employer, Monmouth Ocean Hospital Services Corporation 
(“MONOC”).  Specifically, the District Court held that PEMSA’s challenge to the 
discharge of Michael Dirr was barred by reason of PEMSA’s failure to invoke the 
grievance process set forth in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) between 
PEMSA and MONOC.  As to the challenges to the disciplinary action taken against the 
other two union members, Christopher Elliott and Phil Kramer, the District Court held 
that MONOC’s decisions were authorized by the CBA.  For the reasons that follow, we 
will affirm the District Court orders.   
I. 
 MONOC is a non-profit corporation providing medical transport services.  
PEMSA is the union representing MONOC employees, including Dirr, Elliott and 
Kramer.  MONOC and PEMSA are parties to a CBA that, among other things, governs 
MONOC disciplinary actions against PEMSA members and sets forth a grievance 
process for the resolution of “any controversy arising over the interpretation, application 
or alleged violation of [the] CBA.”  (App. 771 a).  Authorized discipline under the CBA 
ranges from counseling, to issuance of  “disciplinary units,” to immediate termination.  
Under Article 4(A)(v) of the CBA, MONOC retains the right “[t]o remediate, counsel, 
suspend, demote, discharge, or take any other appropriate disciplinary action for just 
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cause against any employee consistent with the terms of [the CBA], subject to the 
grievance procedure.”  (App. 762a; emphasis added)  The CBA lists more than 20 
specific infractions that may, in the sole discretion of MONOC, result in immediate 
discharge.    
 A.  Disciplinary Units Issued to Elliott 
 On August 28, 2012, MONOC disciplined Elliott for the unauthorized carrying of 
a patient in Elliott’s arms through the patient’s house and to the patient’s bed.  There is 
no dispute that this action violated MONOC policy.  The patient had complained of pain 
while being carried, and the patient’s wife had informed MONOC that the patient’s pre-
existing back injury was aggravated as a result of being physically carried by Elliott.  
MONOC issued Elliott four “disciplinary units” for the alleged violation of Article 
6(1)(C)(iii) of the CBA, which authorized MONOC to discipline an employee for: 
xx.  Egregious deviation(s) from the standard of behavior associated with 
the employee’s position, violations of company policies, procedures, 
protocols, performance standards, rules of employer, and/or infractions 
against local, state, or federal laws, rules, and/or governmental or 
accrediting agency regulations. 
 
(App. 769a.)  PEMSA unsuccessfully grieved the discipline imposed upon Elliott 
through the first two steps of the grievance process. MONOC denied PEMSA’s request 
to mediate the matter. 1   
 B.  Termination of Kramer 
                                              
1 Both PEMSA and MONOC must agree to proceed to mediation. 
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 On November 6, 2012, MONOC terminated Kramer for refusing a work 
assignment and abandoning his position.  The “Notice of Employee Action” issued to 
Kramer by MONOC’s Director of Operations stated: 
On the morning of November 1, 2012, you refused to work with the 
partner you were assigned and chose to abandon your position.  
Aggravating this incident was the fact that New Jersey was operating 
under a state of emergency and our ability to staff all of our units was 
challenging at best. 
 
The Notice indicated that the basis for the termination decision was Article 6(1)(E)(xvi) 
of the CBA, which provides: 
MONOC retains the right to discharge an employee for the first offense of any of 
the below infractions.  MONOC in its sole discretion may consider mitigating 
circumstances and determine a lesser penalty is warranted.  The following conduct 
is prohibited, and will subject any employee or contractor who might engage in 
same, to disciplinary action up to and/or including termination. 
. . .  
xvi.  The refusal of an employee to follow the directions and instructions of 
Management concerning a work-related matter, absent an objective belief that the 
direction is patently illegal, immoral, or would result in direct and immediate harm 
to a patient or other person. 
 
(App. 767a, 769a.) 
 PEMSA unsuccessfully grieved Kramer’s discharge through the first two steps of 
the grievance process prescribed by the CBA.  PEMSA did not request that the matter 
proceed to mediation with the New Jersey State Board of Mediation, the final step in the 
CBA grievance process. 
 C.  Terminationof Dirr 
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 On March 28, 2013, Dirr received a phone call from his MONOC supervisor, 
Jeffrey Peck, who informed Dirr that he had the option to resign or be terminated.  Dirr, 
accompanied by his PEMSA representative, Kramer, then met with Peck.  According to 
the Amended Complaint: 
 44.  At the meeting, Kramer presented a defense for Dirr and 
questioned the bona fides of the intended discipline against Dirr.  Kramer 
asked questions of Peck regarding the investigation into Dirr’s alleged 
conduct and whether or not the witnesses were questioned.  Peck advised 
Kramer that the witnesses were not questioned causing Kramer to again 
question the veracity of the charges against Dirr. 
 
 45.  Kramer asked Peck to confirm that Dirr was not given the 
opportunity to confront his accusers, that the witnesses were not 
questioned, and that Dirr was not given any of the evidence against him.   
 
 46.  At that point, Peck contacted Defendant’s Vice President of 
Administration, Stacy Quagliana to discuss the matter. 
 
 47.  Peck then requested that Dirr meet without Kramer, which he 
did. 
 
 48.  Dirr left the meeting with Peck having been served with a 
“Notice of Employee Action” dated March 28, 2013. 
 
 49.  The March 28, 2013 “Notice of Employee Action” stated that 
Dirr was terminated  . . . for allegedly refusing an assignment. 
 
(App. 114a-115a.) 
II. 
 One week after Dirr was fired, PEMSA instituted this action without grieving 
Dirr’s termination.  Asserting that MONOC’s disciplinary actions violated the CBA 
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because they were not supported by “just cause,” PEMSA sought relief under Section 
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185.2  
 On June 1, 2013, MONOC moved pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for dismissal 
of the claims asserted on behalf of Kramer and Dirr on the ground that they had failed to 
exhaust the CBA grievance process.  The District Court denied the motion as to the 
claims asserted on behalf of Kramer, for whom PEMSA had invoked the grievance 
process, but granted the motion as to the claims asserted on behalf of Dirr, for whom 
PEMSA had not pursued the grievance mechanism.   The District Court, however, gave 
PEMSA the opportunity file an amended complaint to attempt to avoid dismissal of the 
claims relating to Dirr by alleging facts sufficient to excuse its admitted failure to invoke 
the CBA grievance process.3 
 PEMSA filed an Amended Complaint on August 28, 2013, and MONOC again 
moved for dismissal of the claims asserted on behalf of Dirr based upon PEMSA’s 
failure to at least invoke the grievance process.  Concluding that the additional 
allegations of the Amended Complaint concerning the fact that a union representative 
accompanied Dirr to his pre-termination meeting with Peck were not sufficient to invoke 
                                              
2 PEMSA’s complaint also asserted breaches of the CBA in connection with 
discipline imposed by MONOC on three other PEMSA members.  The parties have 
settled the claims asserted on behalf of two of those members, and PEMSA is not 
pursuing this appeal on behalf of the third member. 
 
3 The District Court concluded that PEMSA’s pursuit of the first two steps of the 
three-step grievance process on behalf of Kramer was sufficient to avoid dismissal on 
exhaustion grounds in light of the Complaint’s averment that PEMSA was informed that 
“the grievance procedures did not apply to disciplinary actions.”  (App. 23a) 
 7 
 
the grievance machinery, the District Court dismissed PEMSA’s claims relating to Dirr 
with prejudice. PEMSA’s motion for reconsideration of this ruling was denied. 
 Following discovery, MONOC moved for summary judgment on the merits of 
the claims concerning Elliott and Kramer. Concluding that the record established “just 
cause” for the disciplinary actions in question, the District court granted summary 
judgment in favor of MONOC.  This appeal on behalf of Dirr, Elliott and Kramer 
followed. 
III. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 185a.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We engage in a plenary review of a 
district court’s dismissal of claims, accepting all well-pleaded factual allegations as true 
and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.  Bell v. Cheswick 
Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188, 193 n.5 (3d Cir. 2003).  “To survive a motion to 
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 
 A.  Dismissal of Claims Asserted on behalf of Dirr 
 Before bringing an action under Section 301 of the LMRA, a litigant must 
generally exhaust all available administrative remedies agreed upon by the employer and 
the union.  Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965).  This Court has 
recognized three exceptions to the exhaustion requirement: “(1) when the employer 
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repudiates the private grievance machinery; (2) when resort to administrative remedies 
would be futile; and (3) when the employer is joined in a [] claim against the union” for 
breaching its duty of fair representation.  Sisco v. Consol. Rail Corp., 732 F.2d 1188, 
1190 (3d Cir. 1984).  Nonetheless, an employee cannot sidestep the administrative 
grievance process “unless he attempted to utilize the contractual procedures for settling 
his dispute with his employer.”  Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 563 
(1976); see also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184 (1967) (“[I]t is settled that the 
employee must at least attempt to exhaust exclusive grievance and arbitration procedures 
established by the bargaining agreement.”). 
 PEMSA concedes that it did not invoke the three-step grievance process on behalf 
of Dirr.  Rather, PEMSA argues that it satisfied the requirement that it attempt to use the 
CBA dispute resolution process by sending a union representative to attend and present a 
defense for Dirr at the meeting in which MONOC terminated his employment.  (See 
App. 114a–115a)  Because any such attempt was prior to or contemporaneous with the 
discipline imposed on Dirr—the termination of his employment—it cannot constitute an 
attempt to challenge Dirr’s discipline through the CBA dispute resolution mechanism.  
Accordingly, the District Court did not err in dismissing PEMSA’s claims on behalf of 
Dirr. 
 B.  Summary Judgment on the Claims Concering Elliott and Kramer 
 We engage in a plenary review of a district court’s grant of summary judgment, 
“apply[ing] the same test the district court should have utilized initially.”  Giles v. 
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Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir. 2009).  A motion for summary judgment is 
properly granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law.”  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(c)).  Any questions of fact or inferences must be considered “in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party.”  Peters v. Del. River Port Auth., 16 F.3d 1346, 1349 
(3d Cir. 1994). 
 Under Article 4(A)(v) of the CBA, MONOC “retains and reserves unto itself, 
without limitation, all powers, rights, authority, duties and responsibilities vested in  
it . . . [t]o remediate, counsel, suspend, demote, discharge, or take any other appropriate 
disciplinary action for just cause against any employee consistent with the terms of this 
[CBA], subject to the grievance procedure.”  (App. 762a)  Article 6(1) of the CBA 
provides the specific terms on which MONOC may impose discipline.  (App. 764a–
770a.)  The CBA also provides that in conducting an investigation for potential 
disciplinary action, “[t]he investigating manager shall make determinations regarding 
the credibility of each person who provides information to the manager during an 
investigation” and “[s]uch determinations shall be made within the investigating 
manager’s discretion, and . . . may form the basis in whole, or in part, for disciplinary 
action.”  (App. 764a)  Under the CBA, MONOC had “the right to discharge an 
employee for a first offense” of any of more than twenty separately enumerated 
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infractions.  (App 767a.)  Moreover, MONOC retained “sole discretion [to] consider 
mitigating circumstances and determine a lesser penalty is warranted.”  (Id.) 
   PEMSA argues that whether “just cause” existed with regard to MONOC’s 
discipline imposed on Elliott and the termination of Kramer involves questions of fact 
and, thus, the District Court should not have granted summary judgment in favor of 
MONOC with regard to those claims.  PEMSA supports this argument by citing to a 
number of cases where deference was given to an arbitrator with respect to determining 
when “just cause” exists.  There is, however, no arbitration clause in the CBA at issue in 
this case and the language of the CBA specifically provides MONOC with discretion in 
determining the degree of discipline to impose on employees.  Thus, the CBA 
unambiguously gives MONOC the discretion to make just cause determinations.  
Furthermore, when considered in its entirety, the CBA defines more than twenty 
instances of specific conduct that may constitute “just cause” for termination of 
employment.  Stated otherwise, when one of those more than twenty types of infractions 
occur, then “just cause” for discipline exists. 
 1.  Discipline as to Elliott  
 MONOC had issued four disciplinary units to Elliott, a full-time emergency 
medical technician (“EMT”), for violating company policy prohibiting the carrying of a 
patient.  Under Article 6(1)(C)(iii)(a) of the CBA, MONOC had the right to impose four 
disciplinary units for the first incident that causes physical harm to a person due to a 
violation of MONOC policies and procedures.  (App. 766a.)  There is no dispute that in 
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August of 2012 Elliott had carried a hospice patient in his arms in violation of MONOC 
Policy No. 726.  The patient complained of pain at the time of the improper handling, 
and the patient’s wife later complained to MONOC that the improper handling had 
caused the patient pain and aggravated an existing back injury.  Two MONOC 
investigators who looked into the incident spoke with Elliott and the patient’s wife about 
the allegations.  PEMSA concedes that Elliott violated the policy by carrying the patient 
in his arms, the patient complained of pain during the improper handling,4 Elliott failed 
to file an incident report with regard to the incident, and the patient’s wife later 
complained to MONOC about the incident. 
 PEMSA argues that MONOC’s decision to impose the disciplinary units was 
improper because (1) the evidence was insufficient to show that Elliott’s actions caused 
the patient harm; and (2) MONOC did not conduct a sufficiently thorough investigation 
into the incident.  There was, however, a factual basis for MONOC’s finding that the 
patient suffered physical harm.  The discipline imposed is not inconsistent with the 
terms of the CBA.  Furthermore, the CBA explicitly gives MONOC investigating 
managers the discretion to determine credibility and whether the evidence warrants 
discipline.  PEMSA’s disagreement with how MONOC conducted its investigation and 
with the weight MONOC accorded certain evidence ignores the fact that the CBA ceded 
to MONOC the prerogative of making credibility determinations and that “such 
                                              
4 PEMSA disputes the characterization of the patient’s complaints as “crying out” 
in pain, but acknowledges that the patient “stated ‘[o]uch that hurts’” during the 
improper handling.  (Appellant Br. 7) 
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determinations may form the basis in whole, or in part, for disciplinary action.”  (App. 
764a.)  Discipline imposed based upon determinations left to the discretion of MONOC 
does not violate the CBA.  Thus, because MONOC’s actions in imposing the 
disciplinary units on Elliott were in accordance with the discretion provided to it under 
the CBA, the District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of MONOC. 
 2.  Discipline as to Kramer 
 MONOC terminated Kramer’s employment as a per diem EMT after he refused 
to work a shift with a nurse with whom he had a prior dispute.  This refusal occurred on 
November 1, 2012, while New Jersey was under a state of emergency in the aftermath of 
Hurricane Sandy.  Kramer had been scheduled to work a shift starting at 9:00 a.m. that 
day, but arrived at MONOC’s headquarters at 5:30 a.m. upon a manager’s request that 
he report to work three hours early.  When he was notified that he would be working 
with the nurse, Kramer declined the shift and left the job site, despite being warned that 
he would be suspended if he did not work the shift.  MONOC ultimately terminated 
Kramer’s employment pursuant to Article 6(1), subpart E(xvi) of the CBA, which 
specifies that “[t]he refusal by an employee to follow the directives and instructions of 
Management concerning a work-related matter, absent an objective belief that the 
directive is patently illegal, immoral, or would result in direct and immediate harm to a 
patient or other person” constitutes grounds for termination.  (App. 769a) 
 PEMSA argues that Kramer believed he was entitled to decline the assignment 
because he was not scheduled to work that shift, that other employees did not receive 
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discipline as severe for similar conduct,5 and that MONOC terminated Kramer because 
of personal animus.6  Even if Kramer had a subjective belief that he did not need to work 
that shift and that MONOC was biased against him, Kramer does not deny that he 
committed an act subjecting him to termination under the CBA.  Furthermore, even if, as 
Kramer suggests, other employees received lesser punishment for similar offenses, the 
CBA specifically gives MONOC the “sole discretion” to consider any lesser penalties or 
mitigating factors and was not required to give lesser punishment in consideration of 
such factors.  (App. 767a.)  Thus, MONOC acted within the substantial discretion 
afforded it under the CBA in determining that there was just cause to terminate 
Kramer’s employment.  Accordingly, the District Court appropriately granted summary 
judgment in favor of MONOC. 
IV. 
 For the reasons set forth herein, we will affirm the District Court’s Orders 
dismissing PEMSA’s claims on behalf of Dirr and granting summary judgment in favor 
of MONOC on the claims concerning Elliott and Kramer. 
                                              
5 PEMSA asserts that, following Kramer’s termination, another employee 
allegedly refused a work assignment because of a personal dispute with a co-worker and 
received a mere non-disciplinary administrative counseling as discipline for the incident.   
 
6 PEMSA argued that MONOC had a personal animus against Kramer, who had 
served as the PEMSA delegate and represented other PEMSA members in disciplinary 
matters.  To support this argument, PEMSA submitted an email from MONOC’s Senior 
Vice President for Administration who, upon learning about Kramer’s decision to deny 
the November 1 shift, stated she wanted to “take this opportunity to terminate a problem 
employee.”  (App. 1871a) 
